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Abstract
Due to increasing demand for natural gas in Indonesia, the Government now promotes
exploration for coalbedmethane (CBM). Currently, Indonesia has 453 trillion cubic feet (TCF)
of CBM reserves. However, CBM development in the country is still in the exploration phase, 
with significant under-investment. To attract investors, a tailored Production Sharing 
Contracts (PSC) regime is required. Based on a combination of Factor Analysis (FA), 
Discounted Cash Flows (DCF) and Parameter Sensitivity Analysis, the research explores an
optimal scenario of a company’s share of revenue that optimised CBM development
contracts. We find that a combination of 5 years straight line depreciation (SLD), 5% First
Tranche Petroleum (FTP), 78% Contractor Share (CS) and 35% income tax best spreads the 
risk of CBM development and exploitation between the government and the contractor. This
combination is a more suitable PSC regime for developing CBM in an early stage of the 
industry. Therefore, the Governmentmust cede some taxes duringexploration to incentivise 
CBM development. Three PSCs regimes are thus required to fully develop and exploit CBM, 
includingexploration,transitional andexploitationphase PSCs which bettermatch contractor 
risks and returns and ensure reasonable certainty of contractor cost recovery.
Keywords: coalbedmethane , development contracts, ProductionSharingContracts ,
investments, unconventional, naturalgas
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1. Introduction
Indonesia suspended its membership of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) in 2009 because it was no longer a net exporter of oil (OPEC 2014). The country’s oil
and gas production have experienced decline in recent years, whilst domestic energy consumption
has increased (Dartanto 2013; Statistica 2018). The Directorate General of Oil and Gas (DGOG) reports
that energy demand had shifted from oil to gas consumption, noting an average annual growth rate
of 9% between 2003 and 2016 (DGOD 2018). Consequntly, the DGOG predicts a gas supply deficit to
start from 2019 to 2050.
Relatedly, the US Energy Information Administration [EIA] (2014) noted that the
growing population and a strong economy had increased Indonesia’s total energy 
consumption by 44%between 2002 and 2012. In 2015, Indonesia had required50%of imports
to meet its domesticenergy demand (Boston ConsultingGroup 2018) and her demand for oil
increased by 1.4% and 4.4% in 2016 and 2017, respectively (British Petroleum [BP] Statistcial
Review 2017; 2018). Struggling to find new oil reserves, the country explored other energy 
sources including natural gas. In fact, Jero Wacik, the Minister of Energy and Mineral
Resources of Indonesia, stated in his opening speech of the 36th Indonesian Petroleum 
Association Conference, that Indonesia’s targetwas not to increase oil liftings but to shift her
policy paradigm from oil lifting to energy lifting (Oil and Gas Financial Journal [OGFJ] 2012).
Thus, the traditional prolific oil producer would now pursue and exploit a wider array of
energy sources because production from mature oil fields are fallingwhilst domesticdemand
growth has necessitated the importationof a large percentage of its domesticenergy.
The desire to step up production has spurred government’s interest to promote the 
development of unconventional hydrocarbon resources, such as coalbed methane (CBM), a
primary coal seam gas collected from unmined coal seams in Indonesia. By 2016, 60
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unconventionalnaturalgas development contracts had been signed;54 CBM and 6 shale gas 
(SG) blocks, yet these projects according to The Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources
(MEMR), have been stagnant due to lack of operator commitment (The Insider 2018). In late 
2016, 10 SG and CBM licenses were lined up to be relinquished to government
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers [PWC]2018). In 2017, The Government of Indonesia auctioned oil
and gas blocks but failed to attract investors for the unconventionalblocks (The Insider 2018). 
The Government againopened competitive bidding for two unconventionalblocks in its South
Sumatra Basin, projecting that production in this basin alone could reach 1.14 trillion cubic
feet (TCF) of CBM, 75.44 million barrels of oil (Mmbls) and 10.88 TCF of shale gas (ibid).The 
MEMR estimates Indonesia’s CBMreserves to be around 453 TCF, making the country the 6th 
largest reserves holder in the world, with SG reserves of about 574 TCF (PWC 2018). This is
potentially four times the current estimate of 101.40 proved conventional gas reserves in
Indonesia (PWC 2018 ). In particular, the country’s major coal-seam basins and reserves are 
distributedas follows: 183 TCF in the South Sumatra Basin (Mujiyanto and Tiess 2013), 101.6
TCF in the Barito Basin and 80.4 TCF in the Kutai Basin (Thomas 2013).
Despite these bright prospects for CBM development, no significant strides have been
made towards exploiting the resources with activities still largely in the exploration and
appraisal phases (Thomas 2013;PWC2018; The Insider 2018). Nevertheless, the resource has
the potential to attract investment from renowned oil and gas operators. In fact, Indonesia-
Investments (2014) records that the first significant project in Indonesia was the Sanga Sanga
field in East Kalimantan, whichwas awarded in 2009 to a consortium in which BP plc and the 
Italian oil and gas company Eni hold large stakes. This show of interest was however after a
policy response by the government to actively promote the development of the resource 
among potentialoperators. 
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In an attempt by the Indonesian Government to attract investors, legislation was
passed in 2007 to support the Government’s programme to stimulate the development of
unconventional resources (Indonesia-investments 2014). Specifically, this Act of Parliament
suggests that contracts for CBM projects shall be based on Production Sharing Contracts
(PSC). Consequently, MedcoEnergi was awarded the right to commercially developCBMwith
a PSC profit gas split of 45% company share and 55% of government share (International
Energy Agency 2008). The company’s share of profit in CBM PSC is higher than it is for
conventional oil or gas development contracts, which stand at 15% and 30%, respectively
(Indonesia-Investments 2014). 
In 2017, the Government also amended its regulation on cost recovery and income 
tax for upstream oil and gas operations, Government Regulation [GR] 79of 2010, replacing it
with GR27 (PWC2018; Deloitte 2017). GR 27 came into effect on June 2017 andwas intended
to stimulate investment and encourage more oil and gas exploration via a more lenient tax
regime and ‘accelerated’ cost recovery framework. However, even with these interventions, 
CBM development contracts still appear unattractive to the industry, with a serious concern
of the lack of industry interest in the development of CBM.
Given that CBM is in its infancy and the urgent requirement for investment in the 
resource, what should be the focus of government policy to exploit the resource? To what
extent does the split percentage for CBM PSCs appeal to potential CBMoperatorsand attract
investment into Indonesia for the developmentof CBMreserves, given that the development
costs for this resource are much higher than conventional gas or oi l resources (Le 2018;
Hanania et al. 2019; Aguilera 2014; Seidle 2011)?. Further, given the range of uncertainties in
the oil and gas industry andmarkets, to what extent does productioncost, capital expenditure
5
 
 
 
           
  
        
         
          
           
          
         
           
            
         
           
            
          
          
          
           
           
          
             
         
             
  
and market factors such as gas price volatility affect the viability of CBM development in
Indonesia?
Although these are fundamental questions which require answers to optimally 
develop Indonesia’s CBM reserves, little attention has been paid by researchers to provide 
better understandingof the current Indonesian CBMdevelopment. For example, Stevens and
Hadiyanto’s (2004) work which is currently the most complete review of CBM in Indonesia,
and has been used as references for many Indonesian CBM research, undoubtedly fails to
account for the current state of CBM development. Nugroho and Arsegianto (1993) did an
economic evaluation of CBM development in Jatibarang Field, but like the work of Stevens
and Hadiyanto, this research has limited relevance to the current discussions onCBM inmany 
aspects. In particular, questions arise on the currency of Nugroho and Arsegianto’s research
today and whether or not their conclusions are still relevant for the CBM industry. It is now
an apparent requirement to update the research on the economics of CBM in Indonesia to
influence government policy. The present research updates the literature on the economics
of Indonesia’s CBMandmore generally, unconventionalnaturalgas development. According
to Craig McMahon, the Head of Asia Upstream Research of Wood Mackenzie (2013), 
Indonesia has enormous potential for CBM, but to unlock this, the fiscal environment needs
to provide greater incentives and operational flexibility to investors. In this study, an optimal
PSC regime that better supports Government’s objective to attract investment to develop
CBM in Indonesia is explored. The analysis particularly focuses on the effects of gas price,
production rates, costs, optimal profit gas split, government taxes and depreciation on
contractor and government cash flows to offer a rendition of an optimal PSC for CBM
development.
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The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature in
relation to CBM reserves in Indonesia, productionmechanisms and cost factors and a brief
history of Indonesian PSC regime. Section 3 discusses the data sources and method of
analysis. Section 4 presents the results and discussion, whilst section 5provides conclusion. 
2. Indonesia’s CBM Resources and Upstream Petroleum Fiscal Framework
2.1 CBM Reserves in Indonesia
Research on CBM in Indonesia dates back to the early 1990s. Nugroho and Arsegianto
(1993) did an economic analysis of CBM development in the Jatibarang Field and estimated
that Indonesia had213 TCFof CBMreserves, spread over 16basins. The authors further noted
that Jatibarang Field, located in West Java, is the best prospective area because of its
established facilities and infrastructure, and the high demand for gas around the area. It is
important to note that no CBM project had been developed at the time of their research. As
an improvement, Kurnely et al. (2003) did a preliminary study of CBM development in the 
South Sumatra basin and estimated Indonesia’s reserves to be around 337 TCF, spread over 
11 basins. The most recent study is by Stevens and Hadiyanto (2004) who argue that there 
are estimated 11 onshore coal basins in Indonesia with the total prospective CBM resources
of 453.3 TCF. Figure 1 shows the location of Indonesia’s major coal basins.
7
 
 
 
           
 
            
            
         
         
       
 
     
           
           
             
        
          
         
            
           
             
            
          
          
        
        
Figure 1: Location of Indonesia’s Coal Basins (Stevens and Hadiyanto 2004)
This CBM estimate is the official estimate of Indonesia’s CBM reserves in most
documents and it is accepted by the Government of Indonesia as the official CBM reserves
(PWC 2018). However, the above studies failed to propose relevant policies to help the 
Indonesian Government to attract investment and develop CBM reserves. Addressing these 
limitations is the focus of this current study.
2.2 ProductionMechanisms and Cost Factors
Critical development factors of CBMare favourable geology; thick gas-rich coal seams
at shallow depths with good fracturing, low ash content saturation and permeability;
favourable gasmarkets and price; low capital and operatingexpenses aswell as a favourable 
fiscal environment (World Energy Council 2016; World Petroleum Council 2008). To extract
CBM from a coal seam reservoir, the reservoir itself needs to be engineered so that the gas
could flow from the reservoir to the borehole and CBM is absorbed on the surface of the coal. 
The water contained in the coal fractures will hold the gas in the matrix of the coal. This
process is very different from a conventional gas reservoir, where the gas is compressed into
the pore space of the reservoir rock and as the pressure goes down, it will easily flow gas to
a wellbore (Seidle 2011). This condition makes CBM an unconventional natural gas resource
and very much more expensive to develop than conventional gas. In particular, CBM
development uses a different method to extract the gas from the reservoir, or in this case, 
the coal seam relative to the different characteristics of a conventional hydrocarbon
reservoir. To develop the unconventional gas resource, CBM projects will require the 
8
 
 
 
              
  
         
          
      
          
             
        
          
           
              
             
          
     
        
         
      
        
     
dewateringprocess of coalbedswhich result in the production of gas at the surface (CBMAsia
2012). 
Moore (2012) states that the time required for dewatering is highly dependent on a
combinationof factors, viz, percent gas saturation anddegree of permeability, and important
mechanical conditions, requiring that, for example the pump size and quality of performance 
are equal. Kurnely et al. (2003) in their study on CBM development in South Sumatra basin
noted that the dewatering stage is about 3 – 5 years depending on the coal characteristics
and its environment before the stable production stage. Typically, CBM projects cover large 
areas of land with producers drillinghundreds ofwells; effectively making the resource very 
expensive to monetise. Horizontal drilling is used to reduce the impact of land access issues
(CBM Asia 2012). CBM Asia (2012) has produced a document on the five phases of the 
development of CBM projects as well as some cost issues associated with CBM projects. In
particular, the critical determinants of the economics of CBM projects include coal basin
characteristics, gas price, infrastructure availability, competition from production of
conventional gas, waste water disposal options, and ease access to gas markets, among
others (Chakhmakhchev 2007; Nugroho and Arsegianto 1993 and Kurnely et al. 2003). By 
combining a range of these widely acceptable CBM development causers, we include an
economic analysis of the effects of fiscal features, especially incentive regime, on the 
attractiveness of the CBM PSC regime. 
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2.3 Current Indonesian PSCRegime
Oil and gas development in Indonesia is performed based on the PSC regime. The 
purpose of this fiscal system was to maximise the Government’s Take [GT] (i.e. Government
share of oil and gas cash flows, after allowable capital and operatingcosts) of hydroca rbon
revenues and control the resource at the same time, whilst protecting the state purse from 
exploration risks (PWC 2018). Consequently, the foundationof the PSC regime is based on
law, The IndonesianBasic Law 1945 Article 33, which states that all natural resources are
controlled by Government andwill be used for prosperity of the people (Ferdian et al. 2014; 
PWC 2018).
From 1966, the Government of Indonesia (GOI) has demonstratedcommitment to
achievinga balance in its fiscal regime to attract investment. The PSC regime in Indonesia
has consequently evolved three times since 1966 to its current form. Table 1 presents a 
summary of the differences between each PSC typology.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
As Table 1 demonstrates, Indonesia has gone through three main PSC generations, but that
the three fiscal elements of its PSCs are fairly constant since 1966, with First Tranche 
Petroleum [FTP], Cost Recovery Limit [CRL], Domestic Market Obligation [DMO], Equity Oil/
Gas to be Split [ETS] and Income Tax being the main features of all fiscal regimes. Together, 
these fiscal elements target oil and gas income for the state andensure government’sbroader 
objectives for the developmentof hydrocarbons in Indonesia are achieved inaccordance with
the country’s Basic Law of 1945 on petroleum and in line with Oil and Gas Law 22/ 2001 as
stated below:
10
 
 
 
            
        
  
   
   
      
            
     
   
   
     
     
         
             
           
             
          
          
            
              
             
  
The law regulatingoil and gas activities is Law No. 22 dated 23 November
2001 (Law No.22). Its stated objectives (Article 3) are to:
a. Guarantee effective, efficient, highly competitive and sustainable 
explorationand exploitation;
b. Assure accountable processing, transport, storage and commercial
businesses through fair and transparent business competition;
c. Guarantee the efficient and effective supply of oil and gas as a source of
energy and to meet domesticneeds;
d. Promote national capacity;
e. Increase state income; and
f. Enhance publicwelfare and prosperity equitably, while maintaining the 
conservation of the environment (PWC2017:15).
In April 2016, the DGOG publisheda 15-year Roadmap (2016-2030) for Indonesia’s oil
and gas sector and projected that $48.2 billion investment will be required to develop gas
infrastructure alone in order to support Government objectives on natural gas development
(DGOG 2018). In the light of current realities of upstream oil and gas development in
Indonesia, the Government, in 2017 amended its laws on upstream oil and gas, replacingGR
79 of 2010 with GR 27. The general purpose of the amendment is to incentivise the 
development of oil and gas in order to attract investment into the country. Table 2 
summarises some of the relevant features of the new regulation – GR 27. As Table 2
demonstrates, the features of GR 27 cut across state revenues includingFTP to tax on uplifts
and transfers.
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INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
3. Data sources and method of analysis
3.1. Data sources
Estimates of Indonesia’s CBM proved reserves, including the characteristics of
Indonesia’amain basins and the map of CBM working area, were adapted from Stevens and
Hadiyanto’s (2004) work and Indonesian DGOG [Dirjen Migas, 2014]. Operating costs and
natural gas prices data were collected from McKinsey Indonesia. To fully appreciate the 
operational envelope that justifiesCBMdevelopment, the naturalgas price was presented in
different scenarios. The fiscal terms of the PSC regime for CBM projects in Indonesia were
collected from the official website ofDirjenMigas. As Figure 2demonstrates, CBMAsia (2012) 
has summarised the terms of CBM PSC in Indonesia and this was used as a reference to
perform the analysis. Included in the flowchart are the main PSC features in a CBM contract.
Figure 2: Fiscal Elements of Most Favorable PSC Regime for Indonesia
Source: CBM Asia (2012)
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3.2. Method of Analysis
The value of oil and gas projects, and in fact mineral resource investments have been
researched widely with the application of technics of varying complexity. Interestingly, the 
discounted cash flowmethod (DCF), based on net present value (NPV), internal rate of return
(IRR), payback period (PBP), etc., is still widely used by industry for evaluating projects of all
scales and complexity. The method also features in oil andgas fiscal studies (MacMillan2000;
Finch et al. 2002; Putten and MacMillan 2004; Meehan 2013; Shafiee et al. 2019), for its
simplicity and ease of understanding and also for the fact that it complements other more
complex decision support approaches (Putten andMacMillan 2004).
Alsomore sophisticatedmethods such as linearprogramming, decision trees, life cycle 
analysis, real options valuations based on beometric brownian motion, mean reverting
processes, etc. have been applied to oil and gas investments (MacMillan 2000; Shafiee et al. 
2019), renewable energy projects (Kim et al. 2017; Fernandes 2011; Kozlova 2017) and
mineral andmetals projects (Zhang et al. 2015; Zhang et al. 2016; Zhanget al. 2017; Haque et
al. 2014; 2016; Ajak and Topal 2015; Jaimungal et al. 2013; Savolainen 2017). Common
justification for such application is the volatile nature of prices and costs that determine the 
value of investments. Indeed real options valuation is a powerful tool to capture the 
underlying uncertainties of commodity prices and to value the importance of flexibilities in
mineral resource operations. The value of oil and gas investments, and in particular 
unconventionalnatural gas, ismuch a function of geology, commodity prices, operatingcosts
but importantly government tax policy too. 
Nonetheless, most of these factors are less controllable by the investor or 
government. For the oil and gas industry, it is commonthat governmentswould rather change 
their tax policies, which they have control over, at times when market, operational and
13
 
 
 
        
            
       
        
            
         
         
       
            
          
        
           
             
          
              
       
           
       
        
          
         
           
          
geological factors render the value of investments less attractive to industry or when these 
factors change in a way that they induce windfalls. Extant research suggests that oil and gas
producing countries have reviewed their resource taxes during unfavourable price regimes
but increase such during favourable price regimes (see for example, Johnson 2003; Nakhle 
2008; Holterud 2011; Stevens 2013; Ivan et al. 2015; Wood Mackenzie 2015). In particular, 
Stevens (2013) find that over thirty-three oil and gas producing countries revised their 
petroleum fiscal contracts and some of them their entire tax regime between 1999 and 2010, 
in response to crude oil and natural gas price changes. 
The focus of this current research is to extend research on such government
interventionist approaches to CBM investments via a review of the petroleum fiscal policy 
duringearly development of the resource in order to encourage investments for exploitation
of CBM. It has been suggested that resource nationalism is a cyclical event (Clarke and
Cummins 2012) and echoed as follows: “…when oil prices decline, companies are enticed to
return to stateswhich had sought to discourage private investment” (Ward 2009:33; Nakhle 
2016). Governments have thus been seen to interfere with oil and gas tax regimes and this
development is of primary interest in this research. 
The estimation of the value of natural gas and its attendant uncertainties that result
from uncertain commodity prices or geology is beyond the scope of this research. For this
reason, DCF approach together with Factor Analysis (FA) and Parameter Sensitivity Analysis, 
was deemed sufficient for investigating the present research. In particular, The data analysis
method is based on Nugroho and Arsegianto’s (1993) approach. The difference between the 
present study and their study is the decision stages involved in each of the methods and the 
critical decision factors considered to arrive at the conclusions. We believe that market and
14
 
 
 
           
              
          
           
           
        
              
          
 
 
        
           
            
         
 
 
     
        
             
             
         
                
   
 
operational factors are critical for any gas development project and therefore we focus on
factors such as taxes, production rates and efficiency, to reach a decision in this research.
Whereas Nugroho and Arsegianto (1993) focus was on the effects of peakproduction, 
production decline rate, and flow efficiency rate, we believe that market factors as well as
geology, and operational factors such as costs, and methods of depreciation of investment
and reserves do have implications for the economics of CBM development. We therefore 
consider all these factors as well as the optimality of fiscal incentives to reach a conclusion in
this research. The following sections give a systematicexplanation of the analytical approach
used.
3.2.1. Step 1: Base Case Modeling of Field X 
The Base Case model was used to generate the results of the cash flow analysis as
would be the case for companies operating under the existing CBM PSC. It is on the basis of
this Base Case that all subsequent simulationswere performed to arrive at our recommended
PSC.
3.2.1.1. Location of Field X
The Base Case was built based on Stevens and Hadiyanto’s (2004) reserve estimate of
453.3 TCF. Since all CBM fields in Indonesia are located onshore, Field X was assumed to be 
located onshore in the South Sumatra Basin. The reason is that the South Sumatra Basin has
the most CBM resources, and already has well established oil and gas infrastructure. The 
South Sumatra Basin also has the best access to market and hence it is assumed to have the 
best prospective for CBM gas. 
15
 
 
 
     
        
          
            
          
           
         
        
 
 
  
          
        
 
  
        
 
  
     
 
         
       
       
3.2.1.2. Recoverable CBM Reserves
CBM production data for Indonesia is unavailable. Hence, a volumetric estimate of
gas-in-place (GIP) was determined based on sorbtion isotherm. Thus, the GIP for coal is a 
function of the maximum original amount of gas that coal can store at equilibrium conditions
under certain pressure andtemperature. Additionally, the net usable area, netcoal thickness,
coal density, and ash content, all combine to determine the volume of GIP - see equation (1). 
Finally, a recovery factor is applied to estimate the commercial volume of gas that can be 
produced – see equation (3). The recoverable reserves were estimated using the following
models:
Equation 1:
𝐺𝐼𝑃 = ((𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑘𝑚2 × 247 × 𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎) × 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑎𝑙 𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠
× (1 − (𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑚𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡)) × 𝐺𝑎𝑠 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 × 𝐶𝑜𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦) … . (1)
Equation 2:
𝐺𝐼𝑃 
= 𝐺𝐼𝑃 (𝐵𝑐𝑓) … . (2)
1𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 
Equation 3:
𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠 = 𝐺𝐼𝑃 (𝐵𝑐𝑓) × 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 … . (3)
All the parameters in the model above, such as gross km2, usable area, net coal
thickness, ash moisture content, gas content, coal density, and recovery factor were based
on a range of characteristics as summarised in Table 3.
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INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
3.2.1.3. Well Schedule and Production Rate
The assumption on well schedule for Field X was benchmarked against Ferdian et al.’s
(2014). The difference is that Field X stops to drill new production wells from year 20 out of
30 years of the field life. Figure 3 illustrates the yearly production rate of Field X.
0.00 
5000.00 
10000.00 
15000.00 
20000.00 
25000.00 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 
M
M
Sc
f 
Yearly Production Rate 
Base Case 
LowRate 
High Rate 
Figure 3: Yearly Production Curves of Field X for All 3 Production Scenarios
3.2.1.4. Cash FlowModelling
Fiscal Incentives Sensitivity Analysis
After the Base Case results were obtained, the next stepwas the incentive sensitivity 
analysis modelling. In this step, all the sensitivity results were determined to be either 
favourable or not. To determine which scenario was best, three investment appraisal
methods NPV, PBP, and IRRwere applied. Equation4 specifies the NPVmodel. These methods
were chosen because they form the basis of economic evaluation of field development
decisions in most oil and gas company.
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Equation 4:
𝑛 
𝑁𝐶𝐹𝑡
𝑁𝑃𝑉(𝑟, 𝑡) = ∑ [ ] … . (4)
(1 + 𝑟)𝑡 
𝑡=0 
Where r is the discount rate – assumed as 10% in this paper and NCF represents theestimated
net cash flows defined in equation 5as follows:
Equation 5:
𝑁𝐶𝐹 = (𝐶𝑅 + 𝐶𝑃𝐺 − 𝐶𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑋 − 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋 − 𝑇𝐴𝑋). . . (5)
It must be noted that our model for NCF is for a PSC regime in Indonesia and differs
from the general PSC cash flows in a typical PSC contract. Our computation ofNCF recognises
that an contractor’s net cash flows in this regime derive from their share of profit gas (SPG), 
reimbursements for cost recovery (CR), contractor operating expenditure (COPEX), capital
expenditure (CCPEX) and taxes.
3.3. Summary ofModel Assumptions
The assumptions used in this research are summarised in Table 4.
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
Gas recovery factor was varied from 10% up to 65%. Well drilling cost in Indonesia is 
assumed to range from US$ 1.5 and 2 million per well. The cost of exploration/core wells in
Indonesia ranges from US$0.6 to 1.5 million/well. The operatingcosts are assumed to range 
from US$ 1.37 to 2.55 per million cubic fee (Mmcf). The gas price is projected at US$
18
 
 
 
          
         
 
     
        
          
        
       
       
    
    
 
       
         
         
          
      
           
           
          
         
   
7.5/Mmcf, but was varied from US$ 6 to 8/Mmcf. We assume a gas price escalation clause in
the CBM contract and consequently the gas price at 3% per year.
4. Results and Discussion
Table 5 presents the results of the cash flow and factor analyses. The table includes
the economic results of the impacts of depreciation methods of the existing fiscal regime 
(Base Case results) as well as the simulated results for two additionalmethods, the 5-year 
straight line depreciation (SLD) and 10-year SLD methods. The same Table also compares the 
economic indicators of the three fiscal regimes, including the base case to represent the 
present CBM fiscal regime.
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE
4.1 Impact of the Choice of DepreciationMethod
In Indonesia, Government Regulation 79 mandates upstream oil and gas companies
to depreciate their assets based on the reducingbalance method (RBM) at 25% per year. The 
results of this study however indicate that the five years SLD expedites contractor cost
recovery and reduces the depreciation time for assets by 5 years. Expectedly, such
accelerated depreciation results in almost $3million additional contractor NPVand fully pays
out contractor investment one year earlier than the existing PSC as seen in Table 5. This
evidence thus presents a supported approachwhich could be adopted by the Government of
Indonesia to achieve its objective to incentivise CBM investments through accelerated capital
cost recovery.
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Although, Article 16 of Regulation 79, as amended by Regulation 27, now permits
companies to cost-recover the residual value of assets deemed to be “no longer able to be 
used” (PWC 2017) as operating expense outright, such amendment fails to recognise the 
implication of the depreciation approach and time on contractor cost recovery for all other 
classes of assets, including those able to be used for petroleum operations. This research thus
suggests further guidance on the choice of depreciationapproach aswell as the useful life of
assets, to complement the amendments ofArticle 16 as enshrined in GR 27.
4.2 A New PSC Regime for CBM Development 
To recommend a suitable PSC regime for the present CBM industry in Indonesia, the 
country’s laws on upstream petroleum operations must be considered. As stated by Ferdian
et al. (2014), the Government of Indonesia should have most of the hydrocarbon revenues, 
based on Indonesian Basic Law of 1945. Oil and Gas Law No. 22 of 2001 further stipulates
Government’s objective for increased state income from oil and gas operations (PWC 2017; 
2018). Consequently, in this research, fiscal terms that generate GT which is 10 percentage 
points lower than the existing fiscal requirement of 55% – i.e. GT lower than 45% are deemed
as failing to satisfy boundary conditions and are eliminated. As Table 5 demonstrates, the PSC
with the fiscal regime based on 5% FTP, 78% CS and 30% corporate tax fails this test and it is
thus removed. 
Mian (2010) states that the profit expectation of the contractor and the Host
Government is one of the boundary conditions that can be used to guide the design of
efficient fiscal regimes for oil and gas. The profit expectation of the government could also
mean howmuch the government iswilling to sacrifice to develop their natural resource. Thus, 
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although Indonesia’s oil and gas law 22/2001 requires 55% of ETS, the infantile state of CBM
development should be considered in the design of a fiscal regime. Given that development
efforts have just been startedwith activities still at the explorationstage, it is necessary that
government policy is geared towards attracting investmentto explore the full potentialof the 
resource. This should then immediately enable investment commitment from industry to
develop the resource. It would be most rational that the government objectives for CBM
development are phased and a policy which focuses less on taxing CBM revenues are
introduced, at least for a term of CBM developmentwhich should not exceed 25 years. 
Although, the Government’s amendment of GR 79, with GR 27, offers some flexibilities
on cost recovery, contractor use of upstream state-owned facilities, tax and regulatory 
climate, among other non-income related reforms, it would be most beneficial for 
Government to recognise the special nature of unconventional resource development and
define further incentives for industry to expedite development. Government fiscal policy 
which focuses on reduced taxes and essentially moderate Government revenue expectations
should be viewed as Government’s contribution to investments towardsthe development of
CBM in Indonesia, in line with petroleum fiscal design thoughts suggested by Mommer (2000) 
and Baunsgaard (2001). Followinga successful establishmentof the industry, a second phase
of CBM development may be defined within which government may review its objectives in
favour of recovering a fairer share of income from CBM. Presently, the country still needs to
attract investors so that CBM resources can be fully unlocked. Optimal Government policy 
should consequently focus on instilling confidence in investors rather than laying down
structures to tax off revenueswhichmay not flow in due to lack of investment in the resource. 
One way to increase the attractiveness of CBM development in Indonesia is by 
incentivising CBM development contracts to grant further certainty to investors on capital
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recovery. Government Regulation 27attempts to achieve this through the reclassificationof
interest cost, community and environmental costs which were non-cost recoverable under 
GR 79. This amendment is particularly important for CBM development because the related
environmental costs for the resource are particularly high. Other incentives recently 
introduce by the Government such as the exemptionof operators from import duties and the 
permission of operators to recover liquified naturalgas (LNG) processingcosts as contained
in Articles 26 and 11 respectively, are timely.
Nonetheless, there is still a lack of clarity in some aspects of GR 27, which further 
introduces uncertainty intoCBM in particular and oil and gas development projects ingeneral. 
Article 10 of GR 27 grants a DMO holiday to contractors. Whilst this is generally within the 
spirit of achievingcertainty of cash flows and expedited contractor cost recovery, it is unclear 
from Article 10 when the DMO holiday terminates, hence failing to eliminate uncertainty. 
Article 10 (a) also stipulates a sliding scale for ETS, to be determined by the MEMR, yet it is
unclear how the sliding scale will interact with split formula indicated in the PSC itself (PWC
2018). This gap could potentially sabotage government efforts to attract investment. 
Furthermore, the discretion granted the MEMR over uplift, import duties, profit gas split is
less desirable than a definitive scientific approach to arrive at contractor cash flows. A CS of
after-tax revenues above 50% could increase the attractiveness of CBM contracts as it could
enable an achievement of the government objective to “Guarantee effective, efficient, highly
competitive and sustainable exploration and exploitation” (Oil and Gas Law 22/2001;PWC
2017:15) with minimal financial detriment to the government. However, as illustrated in
Figure 4, 50% CS after tax is impossible to achieve under the existingPSC regime. The current
ETS ratio for CBM is 55:45 after tax, in favour of the government. 
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Figure 4: Government Take [GT] and Contractor Share of Gross Natural Gas Revenues 
Figure 4 shows Government Take [GT] and CS of Gross Natural Gas Revenues after tax (left) and Government Share of Gross Natural Gas
Revenues [GSGR] Relative to CS including Contractor Cost Recovery [CS+ Cost Rec.] at 57% only under the Current Indonesian PSC Fiscal 
Regime (right). These indicate a rather high Contractor Investment Risk and will most certainly increases investor risk premium for CBM
development.
As presented in subection 2.3, the current Indonesian PSC already provides some 
incentives to the CBM contractors. However, these have failed to attract operator interest as
evidenced by the government’s failed competitive bidding roundsfor unconventional licenses
reported by the Insider (2018) and PWC (2018), respectively. Consequently, the regime 
requires reviewing to include safeguards for potential CBM operators in the light of current
realities within the Indonesian oil and gas industry to inject investment momentum in CBM
development. Incentives should therefore be prioritisedover taxationat an exploratory phase 
of CBM development.
It is argued in this research and as under Table 5, the exploration PSC with a
combination of 5% FTP, 35% tax, and 78% CS produces win-win economics for the 
government and industry. Although, Government receives 49% of income from CBM in this
proposal, the resource is more likely to get developed and the contractor has increased
opportunity to recover their costs plus reasonable profits. This regime is superior to the 
existing CBM PSC regime and therefore we argue that it is more appropriate for CBM
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development because it (1) satisfies government’s desire to attract investment and (2) 
returns a reasonable income to the state. 
Figure 5 presents GT of 49% against contractor take of 51%. Unconventional natural
gas contracts tend to have more lenient fiscal regimes, often with a generous fiscal climate, 
especially where little or no prior geological history and or commercial production is known. 
The UK’s fiscal regime for SG has been cited as generous (HM Treasury 2013) and lends
credence to the foregoing argument. Relatedly, Stevens (2013) confirms that the US’s SG
revolution was partly possible due to significant tax breaks offered by the US Government. 
Johnston (2003b) states that an ideal PSC regime should allow flexibility to accommodate 
changes in perceived prospects and economic conditions. We are convinced that the PSC
terms proposed in this research are ideal for exploration and exploitation but caution that
such regime should be replaced once reasonable progress has been made into exploitation
and the contractor has recovered an agreed portion of their investments.
Figure 5: CBM ExplorationProductionSharingContract
Figure5 shows GT and Contractor Shareof Gross Revenues [CSGR] for the recommended PSC for CBM Exploration. This tax regime allocates 
more of gross CBM revenues to the contractor for their cost recovery plus reasonable profits in recognition of the higher geo logical risks
associatedwith exploration of the resource given the lack of previous commercial development in Indonesia. Such regime thus emphasises
risk sharing between the government and the CBM contractors via a trade-off of government revenues at the expl oration stageof industry.
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Historically, and as indicated in subsection 2.3, Indonesia’s PSC has undergone 
changes in the gas revenue sharing, and certainly, modifying the current PSC to support CBM
developmentwould not be the first time. For example, and as indicated in Table 1, in the 2nd 
Generation PSC, the CS for gas was almost 80%. This percentage of CS later changed to 57.7%
in the 3rd Generation PSC. Current conventional gas split in Indonesia is 70:30, in favour of the 
government. Consequently, the state needs to adapt its PSC to the changing risks andrewards
to the development phases of CBM. Petroleum fiscal systems have been cited to evolve in
response to product price (Nakhle 2008), geological and operational factors aswell as political
factors. As an example, the UK doubled its supplementary charge (SC) in 2005 in response to
increased oil price from $25 to over $55 per barrel (The Guardian 6Dec 2005). Conversely, oil
and gas producing countries cede fiscal taxes to industry as incentives during low price and
poor geological regimes to attract investment (Mansour and Nakhle 2016). For example, 
Norway abolished royalty from its petroleum fiscal regime in 2000 to attract investment
(Holterud 2011). In other words, governments do tighten their fiscal terms in response to
increased investments and more favourable operational and market conditions (Ivan et al.
2015; WoodMackenzie 2015; Ward 2009; Clarke and Cummins 2012) to satisfy their revenue 
objectivesmore fully.
For emerging unconventional oil and gas producing countries, such flexibility in fiscal
regimes is especially required to efficiently and effectively develop their natural resources
due to the higher cost and remarkably high risks associatedwith the resource. Nakhle (2016)
suggests that price is a fundamental determinant of host governments’ bargaining power in
oil and gas contract negotiations. The author adds that host governments’ bargaining power 
may be weak due to lowoil price, lack of infrastructure, political stalement, delays in decision
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making and security risk. We extend this argument and suggest that for countries that are
new to the exploitation of unconventional naturalgas and indeed all forms of hydrocarbons, 
regardless of the quality of geology, market or operational factors, the relative bargaining
power of the states, are lower due to the inherently higher geological risks. Host governments
must thus recognise this and design the most suitable fiscal regimes that support the 
development of their resources. Bargainingpower, which should also translate into revenue 
earning power for the states may even be far lower if the resource to be invested in and
exploited is unconventional, as it carries more risks to develop (see Acquah-Andoh 2015).
Governmentsmust thus be ready to cede taxes and offer even more incentives and support
that encourage investment in the resource. At the exploration phase CBM development in
Indonesia will thus thrive well under the ‘exploration phase’ PSC on the foregoing fiscal
conditions. Relatedly, to bridge the gap between an exploration PSC to exploitation PSC
regime, a ‘Transitional PSC’, which comprises 5% FTP 49% CS and 35% corporate tax is
proposed. 
Table 6 present the two-factor analysis of the transitionalPSC terms.
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE
As Table 6 demostrates, the terms are suitable for transitional PSC because
government can better increase GT progressively from 49% to 51% and eventually back to
55%. After the transitionalPSC regime, the governmentmay return to a GT of 55% to achieve 
its financial objectives of the Oil and Gas Law 22/2001 or apply an entirely new regime. The 
dynamics of the oil and gas industry require the design of petroleum fiscal regimes to adapt
to the changing realities of industry. Indonesia possesses enormous experience of managing
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fiscal regime transitions that have arisen as a result of changes in petroleum laws (see Table 
1 for Indonesia’s historicalPSC regimes). For example, PWC (2018) and Deliotte (2017) report
that the country amended GR79 on oil and gas operations and replaced it with GR 27, where 
the government outlined transitionalprocedures andrules to govern the process from GR 79 
to GR 27. A change from the ‘exploration phase’ PSC to an exploitation phase PSC via a
transitional PSC thus appears to be a familiar practice in Indonesia, and this is most suitable 
for CBM development in the country.
The foregoing analysis emphasises risk sharingbetween the state and the contractor 
but progressively increases government receipts as the CBM industry matures. Thatway, the 
contractor can recover more of their investment and adapt to changes in progressive PSC
regimes. Such reasoning is consistentwith petroleum fiscal design objectives. Consequently, 
for Indonesia, a substantive ‘exploitation phase’ PSC regime which adapts to the relatively 
lesser geological risks faced by industry at the production phase compared to the exploration
phase should thus become the fiscal framework that governs CBM production after the 
transitional phase. As indicated in Figure 6, the government may apply the ‘exploitation
phase’ PSC (New PSC Term) with these terms: (1) increased FTP to 10%; (2) reduced CS to 60%
(before tax) and (3) increased corporate tax to 45%. The results of this new PSC regime are
presented in Figure 6.
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Figure 6: Proposed PSC for CBM Exploitation
Figure 6 demonstrates progressive government take [GT] and GSGR from the transitional PSC, in light of the relatively lower geological 
uncertainty faced by CBM contractors at the production stage compared to the higher risks at the infantile/ exploration phase of industry.
By applying the above terms and, as Figure 6 illustrates, GT and GSGR could reach up to 67%
and 51% respectively, to fully meet the requirements of law 22/2001. This approach should
better satisfy Indonesia’s revenue expectations from oil and gas development, whilst securing
optimal investment to unlock the full potential of its CBM resource at the exploratory stage 
of the industry.
4.3 The Impact of Gas Price, Capital Cost, Operating Cost, and Production Rate
The ability to overcome the effects of fluctuations in costs, gas price, and rate of
productionwill be necessary to ensure CBM is viable in Indonesia. Figure 7 compares the IRR
from the sensitivity analysis performed on the existing PSC and the proposed CBM
exploitationPSC scenarios. 
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Figure 7: The Relative Returns of the existingPSC and the proposed CBMExploitation PSC
Figure 7 shows a comparison of returns for CBM contractors relative to fluctuating operational and market conditions under the existing
PSC (PSC 1) and the Proposed PSC (PSC 2). PSC 2 shows superior resistanceand viableeconomics to changes in production flow rates, natural 
gas price, operating expenses [Opex] and capital expenses [Capex].
As Figure 7 shows, the high rate scenarios give the best IRR, while the low rate scenarios turn
out to be least attractive. However, a conclusion about the most significant parameters
cannot be made based solely on the charts. To give a clearer illustration of the most critical
parameters, the spider diagram of the NPV for the proposed CBMexploitation PSC (PSC 2) is
required, and it is presented in Figure 8.
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Figure 8: Sensitivity of Proposed CBMExploitation PSC Regime
Figure 8 illustrates theresponsiveness of the proposed CBM exploitation PSC cashflows to the most critical factors of invest ing in CBM. It is
revealed that natural gas price is the most critical factor in CBM exploitation.As pricecannot be controlled by a CBM contractor, it is even
more imperative that government tax regime be designed to safeguard investor capital by sharing in the risks to CBM development via
reasonably reduced state tax income at the exploration phaseof industry.
From Figure 8, the gas price gradient is steepest and most sensitive. It is therefore 
clear at this point that gas price poses the most risk to the cash flows, but gas price is one 
parameter that CBM contractors cannot control. Government tax policy on CBM would thus
need to be crafted to provide reasonable protection for investor capital whilst at the same 
time assuring them a reasonablereturn on their investment. It seems that our proposed PSC
framework offers a more rational approach to attract investments to develop CBM in
Indonesia. 
5. Conclusion and Policy Implications
The potentialof CBM development in Indonesia is huge, which is at an estimated 453 
TCF. Despite this, not much investment has been attracted to the development of the 
resource, with an estimated US$48.2 billion required investment to develop natural gas
infrastructure. In this study, we investigated options for attracting investment to the
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Indonesia’s CBM industry with particular focus on the review of the PSC incentives as
government’s immediate policy. We find, and consequently argue, that a combination of 5-
years SLD and reduced FTP to 5% and income tax to 35% have the potential to increase CS to
78%, without significant reduction in the government’s share of revenues. This proposal
reflects the degree of government’s bargaining power for CBM investments and earning
power towards CBM profits, at this early stage of the industry, and it is more likely to attract
investment interests into CBMdevelopment in Indonesia. 
Our cash flow simulations returned a GT of 49% rather than 55%, and increased the 
Contractor’s Take (CT) from 45% to 51%. This proposal offers more certainty of contractor 
cash flows and promises to be an optimal government policy at an initial stage of CBM
development to establish the industry, build a better understandingof the CBM potentialof
the country and position the country to unlock the full benefits CBM may offer. After 
explorationand in response to improvingoperational, market and project conditions, amore 
tax-focused regime may be designed, such as our ‘exploitation phase’ PSC, to capture a fairer 
share of CBM revenues. The post-transition/ ‘exploitaion phase’ PSC is a combination of
increased FTP to 10%, reduced CS to 60%, and increased tax to 45%. This PSC regime can
generate GT of up to 67%, and the GSGRof 51%. 
To bridge the gap between the recommended initial PSC regime at this infantile stage 
of CBM development and the exploitation phase PSC regime, a transitional PSC, which is a
combination of reduced FTP to 5% and reduced tax to 35% may be adopted. For better
economics, the PSC must permit a contractor to depreciate their assets based on a 5 years
SDL for tax purposes and to enable an accelerated recovery of their costs and investment.
Such policy is required to incentivise investment in CBM in emerging countries where gas
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price has traditionally been low to support investment and where natural gas infrastructure 
tends to be weak. 
In addition, we argue that for countries that will be commercialising potential
unconventional natural gas, the partuclarly high geological and thus investment risks offer
host governments relatively weaker bargainingand hence earningpower. We thus argue that
the proposed petroleum fiscal regime would better attract the required investment to
develop Indonesia’s CBM resource and should provide direction to emerging countries
looking to commercially develop unconventional resources for the first time. Consequently, 
it would be a good policy direction for the government of Inonesia to initiate a review of the 
fiscal policy that governs CBM in order to spur momentum into the resource’s development.
Overall, the current research offers a proposal of what would be an optimal fiscal
policy to attract investment to develop CBM in Indonesia. It also offers some critical fiscal
policy recommendations for emerging countries, that would be developing their 
unconventional natural gas for the first time. However, it may be necessary for future 
research to focus on estimating the effects of the underlying geological and market
uncertainties on the value of CBM contracts. In that way, a definitive cut-off point for the 
introductionof a transitional PSC could be recommended. To complement the findings of this
research, a Monte Carlo approach or real options approach thatmodels uncertainty into, and
investigate the impacts of the behaviour of natural gas price on the profitability of CBM
contracts would add further clarity to the extent towhich price affects CBMcontracts. Finally, 
an application of real options theory to research the moderating impacts and flexibility of
government policy on CBM contracts would provide further insight into fiscal policy design
for developing CBM resources in Indonesia, and more generally unconventional natural gas
development in emerging producingcountries.
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Table 1: PSC Generations of Indonesia (Johnston 2003a) a
Fiscal
Features
1st PSC (1966) 2nd PSC 3rd PSC
FTP Nil Nil 20%
DMO Contractor receives
$0.2/ barrel for 25%
share of their profit
oil after 60 months
of production
After 60 months’ 
production, Contractor 
receives $0.2/ barrel for 
25% “Share Oil” - which
equals 79.5455% of
contractor entitlement
After 60 months
production, Contractor 
receives 10% of market
price for 25% of their 
Share Oil; “Share Oil”
equals 28.8462% of
Contractor entitlement
CRL 40% of gross
production
No Limit 80% Limit
Taxation Nil 56% effective tax 48% effective tax
ETS 65% Government, 
35% Contractor
Oil: 65.9 % Government;
34.1% Contractor
Gas: 20.5% Government;
79.5% Contractor
Oil: 71.2 % Government;
28.8% Contractor
Gas: 42.3% Government;
57.7% Contractor
a Table1 shows the various PSC generations that Indonesia has had sinceoil and gas production. The Table shows that Indonesia has gone
through three main PSC generations, but that the three fiscal elements of its PSCs are fairly constant since1966,with First TranchePetroleum
[FTP], Cost Recovery Limit [CRL], Domestic Market Obligation [DMO], Equity Oil/ Gas to beSplit [ETS] and IncomeTax being th e main features
of all fiscal regimes.
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Table 2: Relevant Tax Features of Government Regulation 27 
Area of
Regulation
Relevant 
Subject
Amendment/ Incentive
Article 10
State Revenues, 
includingFTP
DomesticMarket Obligation (DMO) holiday, 
although it is unclear when this terminates. 
Contractors can now use state-owned infrastructure
for upstream activities at a charge potentially free of
VAT andwithholding tax. A new sliding scale for 
sharingequity oil/gas, thus recognising the effects of
changes in price and production volume.
Article 11 Recoverable LNG
Processing Costs
Amended to allow for recovery of Liquified Natural
Gas [LNG] processingcosts incurred up to the point
of delivery, as exploitation costs.
Article 13 Non-recoverable 
Costs Revised, as
Recoverable
Community development and environmental costs
duringexploitationphase of projects, employee 
income tax borne by the contractor nowpaid as tax
allowance (usinggrossed-upmethod), interest costs, 
are now cost recoverable. Thus, spending relating to
items whichwere not cost recoverable under GR 79
are now cost recoverable 
Article 16 Residual Value of
Assets “no longer
able to be used”
Amended to allow the residual value of assets “no
longer able to be used” to be fully cost recovered
outright. UnderGR 79, such asset would continue to
be depreciated on the basis of the original useful life 
of the asset. 
Article 26 Import duty exemption for goods imported in
relation to petroleum operations in the exploration
and exploitation phases. Reduced subsurface land
and building tax of 100% duringexploration phase 
and up to 100% duringexploitationphase. Incentives
at the exploration phaseare subject to the Minister
of Finance approval.
New Article 
27
Tax on Uplifts and
Transfers
Taxable income arising from uplifts and PSC
transfers, after being reduced by final income tax, 
should not be non-taxable. Thus, these items should
not be subject to any further from this point on. 
State Owned
Facilities – 
Processing, 
Transportation, 
Storage and Sales
With the permission of the Special Taskforce for 
Upstream Oil and Gas Business Activities (SKK
Migas), a contractor can now use spare capacity on
upstream state facilitieswith a potential zero
withholding tax and VAT on the charge for using
such facilities.
Source: PWC 2018; Deloitte 2017
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Table 3: Characteristics of and CBM Reserves of Field X
Field X Estimate
Gross km2 820
Useable Area 63%
Net Coal Thickness (ft) 144
AshMoisture Content 21%
Gas Content (Scf/ton) 160
Coal Density (Ton acre/foot) 1800
Gas in Place (Bcf) 4214
Recoverable Reserves (Bcf) 421
Ft = feet, Scf = standard cubic feet, Bcf = billion cubic feet
Table 4: Assumed Geological Characteristics and Market Conditions for CBMDevelopment 
(Reservoir Characteristics were sourced from Steven and Hadiyanto 2004)
Low Case Most Likely High Case
Gross Square Kilimetre 519 580 1362
Useable Area (%) 55 65 70
Net Coal Thickness (ft) 115 158 160
AshMoisture Content (%) 15 20 28
Gas Content (Scf/ton) 130 150 200
Gas Price ($/Mmcf) 1.75
Exploration Cost ($M/Well) 1.05
Well Cost ($M/well) 1.75
OperatingCosts ($/Mmcf) 1.96
OperatingCosts duringDewatering Phase ($’000) 100
Total Investment ($M) 1.75
OperatingDays in a year (Days) 365
Ft = feet, Scf = standard cubic feet, Mmcf = million cubic feet, $M = million USdollars 
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Table 5: All Fiscal Factors CombinationAnalysis d
Sensitivity Indicators
Existing
PSC
Method: 
Decling
Balance
Analysis
Straight-
Line
Depreciatio 
n 5 Years
Straight-
Line
Depreciati 
on 10
Years
Base Case
IRR (%) 18 18 17
PBP (Years) 12 11 .75 13
NPV @ 10% ($M) 121 124 114
Gov’t Take (%) 55 55 55
Gov’t Share of Gross Revenues (%) 43 43 43
Contractor After tax Share of Revenues ($M) 1,096 1,096 1,096
Contractor After tax Share of Revenues (%) 45 45 45
Contractor Share of Revenues plus Cost Recovery ($M) 2,280 2,280 2,280
Contractor Share of Revenues plus Cost Recovery (%) 57 57 57
Exploratio 
n PSC
FTP = 5% ;
CS = 78%;
Tax = 35%
IRR (%) 19 20 19
PBP (Years) 11 .75 11 12
NPV @ 10%($M) 156 158 149
Gov’t Take (%) 49 49 49
Gov’t Share of Gross Revenues (%) 37 37 37
Contractor After tax Share of Revenues ($M) 1,337 1,337 1,337
Contractor Share of Revenues plus Cost Recovery (%) 51 51 51
Contractor Share of Revenues plus Cost Recovery ($M) 2,521 2,521 2,521
Contractor Share plus Cost Recovery (%) 63 63 63
IRR (%) 20 20 19
Eliminated
PSC
FTP = 5% ;
CS = 78%;
Tax = 30%
PBP (Years) 11.5 11 12
NPV @ 10%($M) 169 171 163
Gov’t Take [GT] (%) 45 45 45
Gov’t Share of Gross Revenues (%) 35 35 35
Contractor After Tax Share of Revenues ($M) 1,439 1,439 1,439
Contractor After tax Share of Revenues (%) 55 55 55
Contractor Share of Revenues plus Cost Recovery ($M) 2,624 2,624 2,624
Contractor Share of Revenues plus Cost Recovery (%) 65 65 65
d 
Table 5 shows four potential production sharing contracts,with different PSC terms. The table indicates thata fiscal regimewith 5% First
Trance Petroleum [FTP], 78% Contractor Share of revenues [CS] and 30% tax are most suitable for CBM exploration and development
compared to the existing PSC (Base Case) or third PSC regime with 5% FTP, 78% CS and 30% tax. The base case PSC appropriates risks to
CBM contractors, the ‘Eliminated’ PSC is overly generous and fails to reasonably meet government revenue objectives and is thus eliminated
from the PSC options. The different colour codes represent the results of different potential PSCs, with 5% FTP, 78% Contractor Share and
35% corporate tax being the superior and optimal tax policy – the ‘Exploration PSC’.
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Table 6: Transitional PSC Terms: Results of the Two-Factor Analysis f
FTP = 5% ;
IRR (%) 19 19 19
PBP (Years) 11.5 11 12.5
IRR (%) 149 152 142
Gov’t Take [GT] (%) 51 51 51
CS = 49%
Tax = 35%
Gov’t Share of Gross Revenues [GSGR] (%) 38.6 38.6 38.6
Contractor Share of Revenues after Tax ($M) 1,285 1,285 1,285
Contractor Share of Revenues after tax (%) 49 49 49
Contractor Share of Revenues plus Cost Recovery ($M) 2,469 2,469 2,469
Contractor Share of Revenues plus Cost Recovery (%) 61 61 61
f 
Table 6 Shows the proposed PSC regime for CBM development during a transition from the ‘exploration’ PSC onto a substantive
‘exploitation phase’ PSC. The Table presents most viable government and contractor share of CBM revenues at 5% First Tranche Petroleum
[FTP] and 35% income tax. Such PSC regime better recognises contractor risks and more suitably rewards investments in CBM. The
Transitional PSC can enableGovernment to increaseGT progressively from49% to 51% and eventually back to 55%. 
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